Secure e-Health System on Passive RFID: Outpatient Clinic and Emergency Care by Kou-Hui Yeh et al.
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Volume 2013, Article ID 752412, 12 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/752412
Research Article
Secure e-Health System on Passive RFID:
Outpatient Clinic and Emergency Care
Kou-Hui Yeh,
1 Nai-Wei Lo,
2 Tzong-Chen Wu,
2 and Chieh Wang
2
1 Department of Information Management, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien 97401, Taiwan
2Department of Information Management, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei 106, Taiwan
Correspondence should be addressed to Kou-Hui Yeh; khyeh@mail.ndhu.edu.tw
Received 11 July 2013; Accepted 8 October 2013
Academic Editor: YingJiu Li
Copyright © 2013 Kou-Hui Yeh et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
In recent years, many researches have demonstrated several RFID-based solutions to enhance patient medication safety and avoid
human errors. Although RFID-based procedure is more efficient than traditional process, patient’s information may be attacked
(or stolen) during the data transmission period. This will cause inappropriate medication use and medical errors. In this paper, we
introduce a robust RFID-based e-Health system which strengthens the system security and protects the patient’s privacy as well. In
addition,oure-Healthsystemcanprovidebetterefficiencyofoutpatientclinicprocedureandemergencycareprocedureinhospital
environment.
1. Introduction
Recently, RFID technology has promptly been adopted to
enhance the communication efficiency in hospital environ-
ment. As a result, the development of a broad range of
newelectronic-Health(e-Hhealth)applicationshasemerged;
these are, for example, patient safety and medication man-
agement [1–8], ubiquitous healthcare systems [9], inpatient-
care systems [10, 11], autotracking clinical interventions [12],
and electronic-health records [13]. All of these applica-
tions promise patient, nurse, doctor, and administrator to
efficiently access relevant health information, enhance the
quality of patient care, reduce healthcare errors, increase col-
laboration, and encourage the adoption of healthy behaviors.
Since new and efficient health information technologies
realize the implementations of diverse e-Health services,
the system security and patient (or hospital administrator)
privacy have been focused by human right organizations,
governments,andresearchcommunity .Theessentialsecurity
elements for e-Health systems are data confidentiality, data
integrity, service availability, accountability, and nonrepu-
diation of information. Meanwhile, personal privacy is the
fundamental human right, and basic privacy protection
principles are universal. Information privacy concerns exist
wherever personally identifiable information is collected,
processed, stored, anddisclosed. In thefollowing,we present
basic information securities and privacy principles [14, 15].
(i) Patient data must be processed fairly and used for
specified and lawful purposes.
(ii) Unauthorized or unlawful processing of patient data
must be efficiently measured and dealt with.
(iii) Accountability should be guaranteed.
(iv) The consent for data processing should be freely
given.
(v) Patient data must not be exploited without adequate
level of protection.
(vi) Patient data must be adequate, relevant, and not
excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is
processed.
( v i i )P a t i e n td a t ap r o c e s s e df o ra n yp u r p o s em u s tn o tb e
kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose.
Based on the previous properties, we argue that data pro-
c e s s i n gs h o u l db el e g a la n dm e e tr e g u l a t o r ya n dc o n t r a c t u a l
obligations. In addition, the patient’s health data (or personal
examination report) is sensitive and, however, usually identi-
fiable. Therefore, personal health data must be well protected2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
tofulfilltheabovementionedsecurityandprivacyprinciples;
forexample,theinternationalstandardISO27799[16]canbe
a solution for security management of health information.
In this paper, we focus on RFID technology integrated
with the process for medicine error reduction, patient (and
inpatient) safety enhancement, and health care management.
In particular, the issues of performance efficiency, system
security, and patient privacy will be thoroughly investigated.
We intend to deliver a patient privacy-aware e-Health system
based on passive RFID to simultaneously enhance system
efficiency and patient privacy.
2. Related Work
In 2007, Agrawal and Johnson [13] proposed a so-called
Hippocratic Database which enables enterprises to comply
with privacy and security laws without impeding the man-
agement of personal health information.To secure electronic
health records, their proposal involves five techniques: (1)
active enforcement of fine-grained data disclosure policies,
(2) efficient auditing of past database access, (3) privacy-
aware data mining, (4) deidentification of personal health
data, and (5) robust information sharing. Later, to deal with
t h ed i ffi c u l t yo fs e c u r e l ym a n a g et h ea g g r e g a t i o no fh e a l t h
related data from various IT environments, Boyd et al. [10]
developed a honest broker mechanism to maintain privacy
for patient care and academic medical research. The honest
broker can offload the burden of housing identifiable data
elements of protected health information as well as manage
date transfer between clinical and research systems.
In 2010, two tag coexistence schemes had been proposed
byChienetal.[2]toeliminatemedicationerrorsandenhance
patient’ssafety.Anonline-basedadministrationprotocoland
a no ffl i n ev e r s i o nw e r ep r o p o s e d ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .H o w e v e r ,
the two proposed mechanisms did not consider important
security and privacy issues [5]. Moreover, the feasibilities of
these two schemes are doubted as only protocol designs are
p r o vided.Tha tis,wi tho u tan ydemosystemim plemen ta tio ns,
the practicability of these two protocols still has space for
improvement. Later, Peris-Lopez et al. [4]i m p l e m e n t e d
an Inpatient Safety RFID System (IS-RFID) which takes
into account the information technology infrastructure of
real hospital environment and completely covers the whole
drug administration process. The system efficiency can be
guaranteed as only lightweight cryptography modules such
asrandomnumbergeneratorandexclusive-oroperationsare
exploitedinIS-RFID.However,theinsecurityofIS-RFIDhas
been pointed by Yen et al. [7]i n2 0 1 2 .
Next, Yu et al. [8]d e v e l o p e dam e c h a n i s mu t i l i z i n g
only simple logic gates, for example, AND, XOR, and ADD
bitwise operations, to construct a secure e-Health system.
Their scheme is efficient as it does not need any complicated
cryptography modules. However, Wu et al. [6]h a v ep o i n t e d
the security vulnerability, that is, impersonation attacks, of
their protocol. A lightweight binding proof protocol is then
proposed to overcome the weakness identified in Yu et al.’s
scheme. Next, Lin and Zhang [3]i n t r o d u c e da nE l l i p t i c
Curve Cryptography- (ECC-) based solution to prove the
coexistence of multiple RF tags and improve patient’s drug
security. Yet, as the heavy computation cost of ECC module
cannot be afforded on resource-constrained RF tags, there
exists a doubt on the feasibility of Lin and Zhang’s scheme.
A wireless autotracking system for clinical intervention,
such as drug administrations and blood tests at the patient
bedside, is proposed by Ohashi et al. [12]. The system can
authenticate patients and nurses, confirm medications, and
provide relevant information based on the clinical situation
and personal location. According to the evaluation, the
proposed system can reduce significant medical errors and
nurse workload with high efficiency. Najera et al. [11], in
their study, first analyzed the case of a medical equipment
tracking system for healthcare facilities enabling both real-
timelocationandtheftprevention.Theauthorsthenprovided
a solution for care and control of patients in a hospital envi-
ronmentbasedonpassiveRFID.Loetal.[9]proposedadeci-
sion support systems, called the Ubiquitous Context-aware
HealthcareServiceSystem(UCHS),whichusesmicrosensors
integrated with RFID technology to sense user’s life vital
signal,suchaselectrocardiogram,heartrate,respiratoryrate,
blood pressure, blood sugar, and temperature and light. The
UCHS is built upon an integrated service platform in which
medical experts’ knowledge and all position and negative
influence of therapy are inferred via semantic network.
In 2013, K¨ ostinger et al. [17]d e v e l o p e daw a r dr o u n d
system with mobile smartphones in which Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) technology is utilized to explore new
waysofinteraction.Thesystemachievespatientidentification
via NFC tags. In their proposed scenario, when the patient
arrives in the hospital, he/she will get a NFC wristband. This
wristband carries information about their real identity, and
in the following the hospital staff will utilize NFC-enabled
mobiledevicetoretrievetheinformationfromthewristband.
In 2013, Ajami and Carter [18]a n a l y z e dt h ea d v a n t a g e s
and disadvantages of adopting RFID in emergency room.
In their study, the advantages are as follows: improving
patient’s safety, eliminating or reducing clinical errors, and
decreasing medical errors to improve patient safety and save
lives. However, the authors argued that the cost of healthcare
system is still high for service providers. In addition, the
privacy, legality, and security are the key problems needed to
be solved in e-Health environment. Safdari et al. [19]h a v e
pointed that the organization needs to concentrate on the
f o l l o w i n gp r i v a c ya n ds e c u r i t yi s s u e s :( 1 )o n l ya u t h o r i z e d
users can access sensitive information, (2) the integrity and
accuracy of data should be guaranteed, and (3) the hospital
needs to protect the patient information. In order to achieve
these three goals, the authors provided a security solution,
that is, anonymous transmission at tag side. That is, user can
retrieve the unique tag ID without revealing the relationship
between the object and the tag ID.
3. The Proposed e-Health System:
Novel Outpatient Clinic Process and
Emergency Care Procedure
In this section, we introduce an efficient and patient privacy-
aware e-Health system based on passive RFID. We assume
that the tags are able to perform PRNG function and XORInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 3
operation. Note that the output of PRNG function must be at
least 96bitsforsystem security.In addition,128bits,256bits,
and 512 bits are acceptable bit lengths also. Before we present
the details of our proposed system, it is important to define
the adversary model of our system environment. In 2001,
Canetti and Krawczyk [20] demonstrate two adversary mod-
els: the unauthenticated-links model and the authenticated-
links model. In the unauthenticated-links model, there exists
aprobabilisticpolynomial-timeattackerEve whocontrolsthe
communicationlinksandthescheduleofprotocolevents.Eve
has the abilities, such as message modification, transmission
injection,andtheprotocoleventrescheduling.Ingeneral,Eve
is able to send the following queries.
(i) Session-statereveal:Eve submitsaparty’sidentityand
an incomplete session identifier to learn the state of
thesession.Note thatEve cannot learn any long-term
secrets or master keys held by the party.
(ii) Session-key query: Eve s u b m i t sap a r t y ’ si d e n t i t ya n d
a complete session identifier to learn the session key
in the intended session.
(iii) Session expiration: Eve s u b m i t sap a r t y ’ si d e n t i t ya n d
a complete session identifier for letting the simulator
e r a s et h es e s s i o nk e ya n dr e l a t e ds e s s i o ns t a t e s .
(iv) Party-corruption query: Eve decides to corrupt a
pa rtya ndlea rn sallsecr etso rmas t erk eyso fthepa rty
a n dt h e nc o m p l e t e l yc o n t r o l st h ep a r t y .
On the other hand, the authenticated-links model is applica-
ble to the case that the attacker does not have the capability
to inject or modify the transmitted messages. Under the
previous assumptions, we then define our adversary model
i n t ot w ot y p e s :t y p eIm o d e la n dt y p eI Im o d e l .I nt y p eI
model, a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker Eve controls
thecommunicationlinksandthescheduleofprotocolevents.
In addition, Eve is able to perform message modification,
transmission injection, and the protocol event reschedul-
ing with oracle queries such as session-state reveal, session-
key query, session expiration, and party-corruption query.
Mapping to the hospital environment, Eve can be the roles
of nurse, doctor, examiner, and system administrator who
are legitimate and verified in our system and possess the
authorization of some system functionalities. In type II
model, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker
Eve, who is restricted to delivering messages generated from
one of the communicating parties to the other one. Mapping
to the hospital environment, this kind of attacker can be an
outsider who does not have the capability to inject or modify
the transmitted messages. Note that an insider without any
entity verification or function authorization can be an exam-
ple also. In addition, all the adversaries can simply obtain an
RF reader and smart card reader to help his/her cryptanaly-
sis.
In the following, we will demonstrate the details of our
system. The proposed system consists of two newly designed
processes on passive RFID that are (1) outpatient clinic
process and (2) emergency care procedure, which accelerate
and improve hospital administration and patient services.
3.1. New Outpatient Clinic Process on Passive RFID. This
subsectionpresentsanoveloutpatientclinicprocessadopting
passive RFID technology. The major procedures are illus-
trated in Figure 1 in which eight processes, that is, parts A
to H, are presented. First, the part A’s purpose is to bind
patient’sidentitywithatemporarilyissuedRFIDtaginwhich
patient’s smart card will be utilized to encrypt (or protect)
tag’s information. Afterward, an anonymous authentication
m e c h a n i s mw i l lb ea d o p t e di np a r tBw h e nd o c t o r sr e q u i r e
confirming patient’s legitimacy. Suppose that the patient is
diagnosed with needing further examination tracking or
condition tracking. Part C will be informed to maintain the
record of the doctor’s diagnosis. Next, in part D the inspector
will reconfirm patient’s legitimacy via patient’s tag, and
generatesevidencesinpartE.Labprocessesbindthedrugjar
and patient’s identity, and store the binding information in
backend server via part F. Finally, parts G and H are utilized
for medication administration. In the following, we illustrate
the details of these eight procedures.
3.1.1. Part A: RFID Tag Issuing & Bind It with ID Card. In
part A (Figure 2), the main target is to bind RF tag Tag𝑖 and
patient’s identity, where the patient’s smart card is used for
dataencryption.Inthispart,thetagandthepatient’sidentity
will be bound in backend server.
(A1) Patient’s tag Tag𝑖 → Reader: PID𝑖.
Patient’s smart card → SCReader: 𝑘𝑖.
In action (A1), the RF reader inquiries the Tag𝑖 and
retrieves the unique identity PID𝑖 of Tag𝑖.N o t et h a t
PID𝑖 can be the patient’s temporary and unique
identity. At the same time, the smart card reader
(SCReader) scans the user’s smart card to retrieve the
patient’s secret key 𝑘𝑖.N o t et h a tt h eu s e r ’ ss m a r tc a r d
can be any type of smart card which possesses the
user’ssecretkeysuchasCitizen Digital Certificate[21]
or Mifare Card [22].
(A2) Reader → SCReader: PID𝑖.
(A3) Data encryption for PID𝑖.
TheRFreadertransfersPID𝑖 toSCReaderforencryp-
tion in action (A2). When SCReader receives the
PID𝑖, it exploits the patient’s secret key 𝑘𝑖 to encrypt
PID𝑖 in action (A3), that is, 𝑥𝑖 = AES𝑘𝑖(PID𝑖),w h e r e
AES represents Advanced Encryption Standard [23].
(A4) SCReader → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑥 𝑖.
(A5) SCReader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑥 𝑖.
Afterward, SCReader generates a pseudonym Pseu𝑖 con-
nected to value 𝑥𝑖 and sends {Pseu𝑖,𝑥 𝑖} to RF reader which
then writes the received value {Pseu𝑖,𝑥 𝑖} to Tag𝑖 to replace
the original value PID𝑖 in action (A4). Meanwhile, SCReader
transmits{Pseu𝑖,𝑥 𝑖}tothebackendserver.Sofar,boththetag
Tag𝑖 andthebackendservermaintainthevaluesPseu𝑖 and𝑥𝑖.
3.1.2. Part B: Examined and Diagnosed by a Doctor (Anony-
mous Authentication). In part B (Figure 3), the patient gets4 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
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Figure 1: The proposed outpatient clinic process based on passive RFID.
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Figure 2: The part A of the new outpatient clinic process.
examination and diagnosis from a doctor. During the pro-
cedures, an anonymous authentication is invoked to protect
patient’s privacy.
(B1) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑛
𝑏
𝑟.
(B2) Tag𝑖: 𝑚𝑏 =𝑥 𝑖 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑏
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).
First,thedoctorutilizestheRFreadertosendanewly
generated random number 𝑛
𝑏
𝑟 to the patient’s tag Tag𝑖
in action (B1). With this random number 𝑛
𝑏
𝑟,T a g 𝑖
computes 𝑚𝑏 =𝑥 𝑖 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑏
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖) in action (B2).
(B3) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑏,𝑛
𝑏
𝑟.
(B4) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑏,𝑛
𝑏
𝑟.
Next,inaction(B3)Tag𝑖 respondsthemessage(Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑏,𝑛
𝑏
𝑟)
to the RF reader which soon forwards (Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑏,𝑛
𝑏
𝑟) to the
backend server. Finally, the backend server exploits Pseu𝑖 to
Patient Reader Backend 
server
(B1)
(B2)
(B3)
(B4)
(mb)? = mb
Tagi
Figure 3: The part B of the new outpatient clinic process.
efficiently retrievethevalue𝑥𝑖 and computes 𝑥𝑖⊕PRNG(𝑛
𝑏
𝑟 ⊕
𝑥𝑖). Then, the backend server verifies the correctness of
𝑚𝑏 in action (B4), that is, whether the received value 𝑚𝑏
equals to the calculated value 𝑥𝑖 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑏
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖) or not.
If this verification is passed, the legitimacy of patient can be
confirmedwithoutrevealinghis/heridentity.Notethatinthis
stage, Pseu𝑖 is used to gain system efficiency. Since Pseu𝑖 is a
randomnoncetemporarilyrepresentingthepatient’sprimary
key during the search in the backend database, Pseu𝑖 will not
reveal any information regarding the patient’s privacy. For
this reason, this design will not influence the system security.
3.1.3. Part C: Further Tracking. Once the patient needs fur-
therphysicalexaminations,partC(Figure 4)willbelaunched.
The doctor firstly encrypts and stores the patient’s diagnosis
(orinspectionreport)withauniquenumber𝑃inthebackend
server. The patient then utilizes the following processes
to record the reference number of his/her diagnosis (or
inspection report) in his/her own tag Tag𝑖.International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 5
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Backend 
server
(C4)
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(C3)
Tagi
Figure 4: The part C of the new outpatient clinic process.
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Figure 5: The part D of the new outpatient clinic process.
(C1) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑛
𝑐
𝑡.
(C2) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑛
𝑐
𝑡.
First of all, Tag𝑖 generates a random number 𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 and
sends {Pseu𝑖,𝑛
𝑐
𝑡} to the RF reader in part (C1). Sec-
ondly, RF reader forwards {Pseu𝑖,𝑛
𝑐
𝑡} to the backend
server in Part (C2).
(C3) Backend Server → Reader: 𝑚𝑐.
(C4) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑚𝑐.
Thirdly, the backend server retrieves the value 𝑥𝑖 via Pseu𝑖
and computes 𝑚𝑐 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 ⊕𝑥 𝑖)⊕𝑃 . Then, the backend
server transmits 𝑚𝑐 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 ⊕𝑥 𝑖)⊕𝑃to the RF reader
in part (C3). Finally, the reader sends 𝑚𝑐 to Tag𝑖 which then
derives the number 𝑃 with the received value 𝑚𝑐,t h a ti s ,𝑃=
𝑚𝑐 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).A ft e rt h a t ,T a g 𝑖 possesses the values 𝑃.
3.1.4. Part D: Examination Room & X-Ray Process (Anony-
mousAuthentication). Oncethepatientobtainsthereference
number, that is, 𝑃, of the diagnosis (or inspection report), the
next stage is performed, that is, examination procedure or X-
ray p r o c e s s .I np a r tD( Figure 5), the inspector at each sub-
stage will reconfirm patient’s legitimacy via patient’s tag Tag𝑖.
(D1) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑛
𝑑
𝑟.
First, the RF reader generates a random number 𝑛
𝑑
𝑟
and sends it to Tag𝑖 in action (D1).
(D2) Tag𝑖: 𝑚𝑑 =( 𝑥 𝑖 ‖𝑃 )⊕PRNG(𝑛
𝑑
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).
(D3) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑑.
(D4) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑑,𝑛
𝑑
𝑟.
Second, Tag𝑖 calculates 𝑚𝑑 =( 𝑥 𝑖 ‖𝑃 )⊕PRNG(𝑛
𝑑
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖)
in action (D2) and transmits {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑑} to the RF reader
in action (D3). Finally, in action (D4) the reader forwards
{Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑑,𝑛
𝑑
𝑟} to the backend server which then retrieves 𝑥𝑖
and 𝑃 via Pseu𝑖 and verifies the correctness of 𝑚𝑑.Th a ti s ,
i ft h er e c e i v e dv a l u e𝑚𝑑, equal to the calculated value (𝑥𝑖 ‖
𝑃) ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑑
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖), the legitimacy of this patient can be
proved.
Patient Reader
Backend 
server
(E1)
(E2)
(E3)
(E4)
(E5)
(E6)
Inspector
Tagi
TagE𝑗
Figure 6: The part E of the new outpatient clinic process.
3.1.5. Part E: Examination Room & X-Ray Process (Evidence
Generation). Oncethelegitimacyofthepatientisconfirmed,
the patient will get the service from examination or X-
ray rooms. In this stage, we will generate a corresponding
evidence(orproof)forfurtherverificationifany.Thatis,part
E(Figure 6)willcreateanevidenceforthepatient’sinspection
procedure.
(E1) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑛
𝑒
𝑟,𝑡 𝑖.
(E2) Tag𝑖: 𝑚𝑒 =( 𝑥 𝑖 ‖𝑃‖𝑡 𝑖)⊕PRNG(𝑛
𝑒
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).
(E3) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒.
First, the RF reader generates a random number 𝑛
𝑒
𝑟
and sends (𝑛
𝑒
𝑟,𝑡 𝑖) to Tag𝑖 in action (E1), where 𝑡𝑖 is the
currenttimestamp.Second,Tag𝑖 computes𝑚𝑒 =( 𝑥 𝑖 ‖
𝑃‖𝑡 𝑖)⊕PRNG(𝑛
𝑒
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖) in action (E2) and then sends
{Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒} to the RF reader in action (E3).
(E4) Tag𝐸𝑖 → Reader: 𝑛
𝑒
𝑟,𝑡 𝑖.
(E5) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟.
(E6) Backend server: digital signature of {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,
𝑛
𝑒
𝑟}.
Next, the tag Tag𝐸𝑖 sends 𝐸𝑖 to the RF reader in action
(E4), where 𝐸𝑖 is the inspector’s identity maintained in the
inspector’s tag Tag𝐸𝑖. Then, the reader transfers the mes-
sage {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟} to the backend server in action (E5).
Finally,thebackendserver willgeneratea digitalsignatureof
{Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟} as an evidence for further verification. This
proof will be useful once possible medical disputes happen.
Note that the technique of digital signature can be RSA [24]
or DSA [25].
3.1.6. Part F: Lab Process. The purpose of lab process (Figure
7) is to bind the target blood jar and patient’s identity in the
backend server. That is, we intend to correctly identify the
source, that is, the target patient, of the target blood jar.
(F1) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 .
Reader → Tag𝐶𝑗: 𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 .
(F2) Tag𝑖: 𝑚𝑓 =𝑥 𝑖 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).
(F3) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑓.
Firstly, in action (F1) the reader generates a random
number 𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 and sends it to Tag𝑖 and Tag𝐶𝑗 embedded6 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
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Figure 7: The part F of the new outpatient clinic process.
on the target blood jar. Then, Tag𝑖 computes 𝑚𝑓 =
𝑥𝑖 ⊕ PRNG(𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖) in the subpart (F2) and issues
{Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑓} to the RF reader in the subpart (F3).
(F4) Tag𝐶𝑗: 𝑚
򸀠
𝑓 =𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝐶 𝑗.
(F5) Tag𝐶𝑗 → Reader: 𝑚
򸀠
𝑓.
Next, Tag𝐶𝑗 sends a computed value 𝑚
򸀠
𝑓 =𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝐶 𝑗 to
thereaderinactions(F4)and(F5),respectively,where
𝐶𝑗 is the identity of Tag𝐶𝑗.
(F6) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑓,𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ,𝐶 𝑗.
(F7) Backend server: verify the legitimacy of the patient.
The RF reader then retrieves 𝐶𝑗 from 𝑚
򸀠
𝑓 and transfers the
message {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑓,𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ,𝐶 𝑗} to the backend server in the
subpart (F6). Finally, in action 7 the backend server retrieves
𝑥𝑖 via Pseu𝑖,a n dv e r i fi e st h el e g i t i m a c yo ft h ep a t i e n t .Th a t
is, the backend server examines whether the computed 𝑥𝑖 ⊕
PRNG(𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖) equals to the received 𝑚𝑓 or not. If it holds,
theserver appends theinformation𝐶𝑗 to the patient’s record.
3.1.7. Part G: Medication Administration. Part G (Figure 8)
discusses the medication administration which is able to
confirm the correctness of each target drug suggested by the
doctor.Inbrief,thisprocesswillverifyifcurrentmedicinejar
isinthedruglistsuggestedbythedoctor;ifyes,themedicine
(or drug) in the jar will be taken into the patient’s unit dose
m e d i c a t i o n .N o t et h a ts i n c et h ed o c t o r ’ sd i a g n o s i sh a sb e e n
completed in parts B and C, the suggested medicine list is
maintained in the backend server. This list corresponds with
the patient’s information 𝑥𝑖.
(G1) Backend Server → Reader: 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟.
First, the backend server generates a random number 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟
and transmits 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟 t ot h eR Fr e a d e r( e . g . ,t h ea c t i o n( G 1 ) ) .
For each tag 𝑀𝑚, 𝑚=1,2,...,𝑛.
Reader → Tag 𝑀𝑚: 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟.
Tag 𝑀𝑚: 𝑚𝑔 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑔
𝑟 ⊕𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 )⊕ID𝑀𝑚.
Tag 𝑀𝑚 → Reader: 𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 ,𝑚 𝑔.
Reader
Backend 
server
(G2)
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Figure 8: The part G of the new outpatient clinic process.
Second, the reader forwards 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟 to the tag 𝑀𝑚 embedded
on each medicine jar (e.g., the subpart (G2)), where 𝑚=
1,2,...,𝑛.Third,thetag𝑀𝑚 computes𝑚𝑔 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑔
𝑟⊕𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 )⊕
ID𝑀𝑚 and sends (𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 ,𝑚 𝑔) to the reader, where 𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 is a random
number generated by the tag 𝑀𝑚 (e.g., the action (G3) and
(G4)).
(G𝑛+2) Reader → Backend Server: 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟, all (𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 ,𝑚 𝑔)s.
Next, the reader forwards 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟 with all (𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 ,𝑚 𝑔)st ot h e
backendserverwhichthenverifiesallthereceivedvalues𝑚𝑔s
to check if ID𝑀𝑚 is in the suggested list. If the verification
holds, the server will inform the pharmacist to put the
drug into unit-dose medication. Finally, the backend server
calculates 𝑚UD = ID𝑀𝑚 ⊕𝑥 𝑖,a n ds t o r e s𝑚UD in both
t h eb a c k e n ds e r v e ra n dt a g𝐷𝑖 embedded on the patient’s
medicine bag.
3.1.8. Part H: Pick Up the Medicine (Matching Verification).
In part H (Figure 9), we present the matching verification in
Outpatient Department (OPD) dispensary when collecting
medicine.
(H1) Reader → Tag𝑖: 𝑛
ℎ
𝑟.
Reader → Tag 𝐷𝑖: 𝑛
ℎ
𝑟.
(H2) Tag𝑖 → Reader: Pseu𝑖, 𝑚𝑡 =( 𝑥 𝑖)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖).
Tag 𝐷𝑖 → Reader: 𝑚ℎ =( 𝑚 UD)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑚 UD).
First, in the subpart (H1) the reader generates a
random number 𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 and sends 𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 to both Tag𝑖 and
the tag 𝐷𝑖 embedded on the patient’s medicine bag.
Second, Tag𝑖 sends Pseu𝑖 and 𝑚𝑡 =( 𝑥 𝑖)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕
𝑥𝑖) to the RF reader, and 𝐷𝑖 transmits 𝑚ℎ =( 𝑚 UD)⊕
PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑚 UD) to the reader in the subpart (H2).
(H3) Reader → Backend Server: Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑡,𝑚 ℎ,𝑛
ℎ
𝑟.International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7
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Figure 9: The part H of the new outpatient clinic process.
When the reader receives these two incoming values, the
reader forwards {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑡,𝑚 ℎ,𝑛
ℎ
𝑟} to the backend server for
the matching verification, that is, whether the received value
𝑚𝑡 is equal to the computed value (𝑥𝑖)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑥 𝑖)
or not, and whether the received value 𝑚ℎ is equal to the
computed value (𝑚UD)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑚 UD) or not. If it is
verified successfully, this medicine bag correctly and actually
belongs to the patient with 𝑥𝑖.N o t et h a tP s e u 𝑖 will be used to
efficiently retrieve corresponding information of the patient.
3.2. Novel Emergency Care Process on Passive RFID. In
Section 3.2,w ep r e se n tan o v e le m e r g e n cyc a r ep r oc e s sb a se d
on passive RFID (Figure 10). The major difference between
outpatient clinic procedure and emergency care process is
whetherthepatientisaroadsidepatientornot.Ingeneral,the
roadside patients may not possess their ID card. This causes
theinconvenienceonidentifyingthesepatients.In such case,
our process will issue a RFID tag as the roadside patient’s
temporary ID card. Please refer to part A of Figure 10.I nt h e
following,wepresentpartAinamoredetailedway.Notethat
the other parts in emergency care process are the same with
that ones in outpatient clinic process. For clarity, we hence
ignore the details of these procedures.
In part A of Figure 10, there are two conditions in this
action. If the patient is roadside patient without ID card, the
hospital will issue an RFID card with a temporary identity
number to this patient. Next, in action (A1) of Figure 11
the RF reader inquiries the Tag𝑖 and retrieves the unique
identity PID𝑖 in action (A1). After that, RF reader transmits
PID𝑖 to the backend server. Since in this stage the roadside
patient does not have any history of medical information,
the consideration of this patient’s privacy can be ignored.
Therefore, PID𝑖 can be substituted for 𝑥𝑖 in emergency
care process until the patient’s has been identified. In other
conditions,ifthisroadsidepatienthastheIDcard,theprocess
will perform the same steps of part A of the new outpatient
clinic process.
4. Security and Efficiency Analyses
Inthissection,wepresentthesecurityandefficiencyanalyses
ofourproposede-Healthsystem,suchasdataconfidentiality
and patient anonymity, data integrity and nonrepudiation,
resistance to the replay attack, and system efficiency.
4.1. Security Analysis. In our proposed e-Health system, we
consider the adversary who does not have the capability to
inject or modify the transmitted messages. Thus, such type
of attacker can be an outsider (and an insider) without any
entity verification or system authorization.
Claim 1. The proposed e-Health system can provide patient
anonymity and data confidentiality
In the outpatient clinic process, we use the key 𝑘𝑖 in
the user’s smart card to encrypt the patient’s PID𝑖 number.
This prevents the attacker from cracking PID𝑖 number as
the attacker cannot know the key. In addition, since 𝑥𝑖 =
AES𝑘𝑖(PID𝑖) is connected with the patient’s secret key 𝑘𝑖,
this value 𝑥𝑖 can correctly be connected to this patient via
𝑘𝑖 even though this patient had left the hospital and this
card had been assigned to another new patient. Moreover,
at each session we utilize the secret value 𝑥𝑖 to protect all
the transmitted messages. Without knowing the value 𝑥𝑖,t h e
adversary cannot obtain the sensitive information regarding
the patient. Hence, our proposed system can ensure the data
confidentiality.
Furthermore, as we implement an anonymous authenti-
cationtechniqueintheproposede-Healthsystem,thedoctor
only needs to know if the patient is legal (or illegal) without
revealing the real identity of this patient. In a more detailed
way, in our proposed system all the messages are transmitted
in cipher format instead of plain text. The secret 𝑥𝑖 is utilized
to protect transmitted messages during each action. In that
case, all sensitive information such as reference number 𝑃
and the patient’s identity are well protected. In addition, at
eachactionweexploitrandomnumbers,thatis,𝑛
𝑏
𝑟,𝑛
𝑐
𝑡,𝑛
𝑑
𝑟,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟,
𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 , 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟,a n d𝑛
ℎ
𝑟, to randomize transmitted messages. On the
other hand, in the emergency care process we cannot learn
thepatient’sidentity(orprivacy)becausetheroadsidepatient
will not provide any information of his/her medical history.
As a result, our proposed system can guarantee the property
of patient anonymity.
Claim 2. The proposed e-Health system can provide data
integrity and nonrepudiation
In part E of our proposed system, we generate a random
number 𝑛
𝑒
𝑟 and retrieve the identity 𝐸𝑖 of the inspector’s tag
Tag𝐸𝑖. Next, to make an evidence for further verification,
the signature of message {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟} is produced [24,
25]. If adversary intends to modify {Pseu𝑖,𝑚 𝑒,𝐸 𝑖,𝑛
𝑒
𝑟},t h e
verificationofthissignaturewillfall.Therefore,thegenerated
evidence can achieve the data integrity and non-repudiation
a tt h es a m et i m e .
Claim 3. The proposed e-Health system can resist to the
replay attack
In each session of our proposed system, we exploit
random numbers, that is, 𝑛
𝑏
𝑟, 𝑛
𝑐
𝑡, 𝑛
𝑑
𝑟, 𝑛
𝑒
𝑟, 𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 , 𝑛
𝑔
𝑟,a n d𝑛
ℎ
𝑟,i n
randomizing transmitted messages. In addition, in part E a
timestamp 𝑡𝑖 is involved with the signature creation. These
random numbers and timestamp cannot only randomize the
transmittedmessagesbutalsoensuretheresistancethereplay
attack.8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
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Figure 10: The proposed emergency care process based on passive RFID.
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Figure 11: The part A of the novel emergency care process.
4.2. Discussion on Efficiency and Security. In this paper, we
adopt the concept of passive RFID to construct our proposed
system, where RF tag only needs to support lightweight
cryptography modules, that is, random number generator
PRNG and exclusive-or operations XOR. This design is one
of the future trends of RFID technology development in
hospital environments [4, 8, 18]. The cost of RFID tag reflects
t h ec a p a b i l i t yo ft a g ;t h a ti s ,h e a v yc r y p t o g r a p h ym o d u l e s
always need higher computation cost while lightweight ones
require fewer. In the hospital environment, the computation
efficiency is highly critical as the processing time for each
medical procedure is one of the major considerations during
the design of an e-Health system. Thus, without any heavy
cryptography modules, we believe that our proposed system
achieves a good system efficiency.
In addition, from Figures 1 and 10,w ec a ne a s i l yc o n d u c t
the traditional outpatient clinic process and emergency care
procedure without any RFID related procedures. Compared
to the original non-RFID hospital administration system, we
believe that the efficiency can be gained during parts D and
F. In general, the process of examination room and LAB is
time consuming. With our design, the process time of these
t w op r o c e s s e sc a nb er e d u c e d ,a n dt h ep a t i e n ts e c u r i t yi s
guaranteedaswell.Notethatalthoughtheotherpartsmainly
focus on security enhancement and privacy protection, we
stillthinkthatourproposede-Healthproceduresareefficient.
In brief, our system introduces a new way to implement
a solution for not only achieving hospital administration
efficiency but also delivering the security enhancement and
privacy protection at the same time.
5. Prototype Implementation
In this section, we demonstrate the prototype implementa-
tion of our proposed e-Health system.
5.1. System Environment. In the prototype implementation,
theen vironmentisshownasthatintheTable 1.Firstofall,we
adopt android with version 4.1.1 as the base operating system
to construct our e-Health system. In addition, we use the
Eclipse Java EE IDE to develop our system. NEXUS 7 tablets
a r eu s e dt os u p p o r tt h ec o m p u t a t i o n sa tt h et a gs i d ea n da t
the reader side. For instance, once the authentication process
begins, the NEXUS 7 tablet at the doctor (or nurse) side will
actasaRFreadertosendarandomnumbertotheMifarecard
at the patient side. Note that we also utilize Mifare cards asInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 9
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Figure 12: The architecture of the outpatient clinic process.
the target RF tags embedded on the drug bag. In our system,
NEXUS7tabletsareusedtotransferandreceiveinformation
viaNearFieldCommunication(NFC)technology.Moreover,
NFC has three communication modes that are peer-to-peer
mode, read/write mode, and card emulation mode. In our
prototypeimplementation,weusereadandwritemodeasthe
basic communication mode.
5.2. System Architecture and Implementation. As mentioned
inSection 3,theoutpatientclinicprocessandemergencycare
process are almost the same. We thus implement only the
outpatient clinic process as the system prototype. Figure 12
is the architecture of implementation of our proposed out-
patient clinic process. In the following, we will illustrate the
implementationofeachprocess(i.e.,partAtopartH).Before
Table 1: Environment description.
Smartphone NEXUS 7
Operating system Android 4.1.1
RFID tag Mifare Card
Development environment Eclipse Java EE IDE
that, we present the system snapshot at the doctor side (i.e.,
the reader side or the server side) in Figure 13, while Figure
14 shows the patient information on the NEXUS 7 tablet at
the doctor side. Similarly, Figures 15 and 16 demonstrate the
system snapshot at the patient side (i.e., the tag side) and the
patientinformationontheNEXUS7tabletatthepatientside,
respectively. Note that in our implementation, the patient10 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Figure 13: The system snapshot of the NEXUS 7 tablet at the doctor
side.
Figure 14: The patient information on the NEXUS 7 tablet at the
doctor side.
also possesses a NEXUS 7 tablet to clearly demonstrate all
processes including the message transmission,entity authen-
tication,matchverification,andothers.TwoNEXUS7tablets
atthedoctorsideandthepatientsidewillnotexploitthepeer-
to-peer mode to ensure that the prototype implementation
actually reflects the practicality of our proposed RFID-based
e-Health system.
(i) RFID Tag Issuing & Bind with ID Card. In our simulation
of part A, we use Mifare card to substitute personal smart
card with a unique secret key. First, the NEXUS 7 tablet at
theserversidescansthecardandexploresthesecretkey𝑘𝑖 to
encrypt the unique identity PID𝑖,t h a ti s𝑥𝑖 = AES𝑘𝑖(PID𝑖).
Second, the NEXUS 7 tablet at the server side stores the
information𝑥𝑖 andatemporarypseudonymPseu𝑖 inbackend
Figure15:ThesystemsnapshotoftheNEXUS7tabletatthepatient
side.
Figure 16: The patient information on the NEXUS 7 tablet at the
patient side.
server for future verification process. Figure 17 presents the
messageforthesuccessoftransmittingthesecretinformation
𝑥𝑖 and Pseu𝑖 to the backend server.
(ii) Authenticating the Patient Identity in Part B, Part D, Part
E,PartF,andPartH.InpartsB,D–F ,andH,weimplementan
anonymous authentication. First, the NEXUS 7 tablet at the
server side sends a random number to the NEXUS 7 tablet
at the patient side (please refer to Figures 13 and 15). This
random number can randomize all transmitted messages.
Then, the application (shown in Figure 15)a tt h ep a t i e n ts i d e
willperformthecorrespondingproceduresasthatmentioned
in Section 3.
(iii) Information Storing at the Patient Side in Part C. Part C
presents the patient needs for further physical examinations.International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 11
Figure 17: Success image of part A.
Figure 18: The write mode in part F.
At first, patient’s encrypted diagnosis with its number 𝑃 is
stored in the backend server. Next, the NEXUS 7 tablet at the
patient side sends a random number 𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 to the server which
then computes 𝑚𝑐 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑐
𝑡 ⊕𝑥 𝑖)⊕𝑃 .Th es e r v e rt h e n
sends 𝑚𝑐 t ot h eN E X U S7t a b l e ta tt h ep a t i e n ts i d e .F i n a l l y ,
the patient possesses the values 𝑃 and 𝑥𝑖.
(iv)LabProcessinPartF.InpartF,ananonymousauthentica-
tion for the patient is firstly performed. Next, the server will
request the information 𝐶𝑗. Then, server generates a random
number 𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 andsendsittotag𝐶𝑗 whichcomputesvalue𝑚
򸀠
𝑓 =
𝑛
𝑓
𝑟 ⊕𝐶 𝑗.T a g𝐶𝑗 send𝑚
򸀠
𝑓 backtotheserver.Finally,theserver
retrieves the number 𝐶𝑗. Figure 18 shows the write mode in
part F.
(v) Medication Administration in Part G. In part G, we use
RFIDcardbindingwiththemedicinejar,andourapplication
Figure 19: Matching success image of part G.
at the server side can confirm the correctness of drugs
suggested by the doctor. The system verifies whether the
medicine jar is in the suggested list. If the verification holds,
theverifiedmedicineswillbeputintopatient’smedicinebag.
First, the application at the doctor side generates a random
number𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 tothetag.Tagcomputes𝑚𝑔 = PRNG(𝑛
𝑔
𝑟⊕𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 )⊕𝑀𝑖
andthensends(𝑛
𝑔
𝑡 ,𝑚 𝑔)totheserver.Next,theserververifies
thereceivedvalue𝑚𝑔 tocheckif𝑀𝑖 isinthedoctorsuggested
list.Afterthat,theservercomputes𝑚UD =𝑀 𝑖⊕𝑥𝑖 and stores
the𝑚UD in the patient’s medicine tag 𝐷𝑖 f o rpa rtH .Figure 19
presents the matching success result of part G.
( v i )P i c kU pt h eM e d i c i n ei nP a r tH .In part H, the server
will first check the validity of the patient. Next, the server
needs to make sure the correctness of the patient’s medicine
tag𝐷𝑖.Asthepreviousauthenticationprocess,theserverfirst
generates a random number and sends it to tag 𝐷𝑖.Th e n ,t a g
𝐷𝑖 computes 𝑚ℎ =( 𝑚 UD)⊕PRNG(𝑛
ℎ
𝑟 ⊕𝑚 UD) and sends 𝑚ℎ
to the server side for matching verification.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced an e-Health system con-
sisting of two processes, that is, outpatient clinic process and
emergency care process. Eight RFID-based procedures are
proposed for enhancing the system efficiency of these two
processes. Several techniques such as data encryption,digital
signature, anonymous authentication, and tag coexistence
proof are adopted as core designs in the proposed system to
simultaneously achieve system security and protect patient
privacy. Based on our prototype implementation, we believe
thatoure-Healthsystemcaneasilybeimplementedinhospi-
tal environment. In brief, our e-Health system demonstrates
the system robustness, user/patient privacy protection, and
the process efficiency on the medical administration. In the
future,morecomplexhospitalscenarioswillbediscussed.For
example,oncepatienttransferringhappens,doctormayneed12 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
to access information from different hospitals. As a result,
the cross-hospital authentication (and authorization) of the
doctor will be considered as a major design issue.
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